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McCLESKEY v. ZANT
111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
A jury convicted Warren McCleskey of murder and two related
robbery counts and sentenced him to death on the basis of the testimony
of a fellow inmate and other evidence. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct.
1454, 1458 (1991).
In January 1981, following the Supreme Court of Georgia's
affirmation of his conviction and the United States Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari, McCleskey filed a petition for state habeas corpus
relief. Of the 23 challenges to his murder conviction and death sentence
contained in McCleskey's amended petition, three concerned the testi-
mony of Offie Evans, the occupant of the jail cell next to McCleskey's.
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1458 (1991). Of those three, two would
eventually result in temporary relief for McCleskey.
First, McCleskey argued that the State violated his due process
rights under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) by failing to
disclose its agreement to drop pending escape charges against Evans in
return for his cooperation and testimony. Id. While Giglio's appeal was
pending, defense counsel discovered new evidence that the U.S. Gov-
ernment had failed to disclose an alleged promise made to its key witness
that the witness would not be prosecuted if he testified for the Govern-
ment. Relying onBrady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Courtheld
that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial "irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. 83,
87.
Second, McCleskey alleged that his statements to Evans were
elicited in a situation created by the State to induce him to make
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, in violation
of the sixth amendment right to counsel as construed in Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at
1459. In Massiah, damaging testimony was elicited from the defendant
by another defendant who had agreed to cooperate with the government
in the continuing investigation of the activities in which both defendants
had allegedly been involved. The Court held that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel had attached even though he was out on bail
when the state, through the use of the cooperative defendant, questioned
him. McCleskey's first state habeas petition was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, in December 1981, McCleskey filed his first federal
habeas corpus petition, which reasserted the Giglio and other claims but
failed to allege the Massiah claim raised in the first state habeas petition.
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 380-384 (N.D. Ga. 1984). The
District Court granted relief on the basis of Giglio, but the Court of
Appeals ultimately reversed. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (C.A.
11 1985). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether Georgia's capital sentencing procedures were constitutional,
and denied relief. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986).
McCleskey filed another unsuccessful state habeas corpus petition
in 1987, part of which centered on Evans' testimony, again alleging the
State had an agreement with Evans that it had failed to disclose. The
Supreme Court of Georgia denied McCleskey's application for a certifi-
cate of probable cause.
One month before he filed his second federal petition, McCleskey
obtained a 21-page statement made by Evans to the Atlanta police
department two weeks before the trial began. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.
Ct. at 1454. The existence and not the content of the document supported
the supposed relationship between Evans and the police. It suggested
that the State covertly planted Evans in an adjoining cell for the purpose
ofeliciting incriminating statements thatcouldbe used againstMcCleskey
at trial. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1487. McCleskey had not had
the benefit of this document when he raised his first Massiah claim. The
statement related pretrial jailhouse conversations that Evans had alleg-
edly had with McCleskey, including one in which Evans had posed as a
co-defendant's uncle and claimed that he, Evans, was supposed to
participate in the robbery. Id. at 1472. On the basis of this document,
McCleskey found a witness, Ulysses Worthy, ajailer where McCleskey
had been confined pretrial, who ultimately testified that "someone at
some time requested permission to move Evans near McCleskey's cell."
Id. at 1460. The newly discovered statement also recounted that Evans
had posed as an uncle of one of McCleskey's co-defendants during
conversations with McCleskey. All of this evidence strengthened
McCleskey's Massiah claim-which he raised in the second federal
petition but had not raised in the first federal petition-that Evans was
working in direct concert with state officials during the conversations
and that the authorities deliberately elicited inculpatory statements from
McCleskey while he was without counsel. Id.
In December 1987, the United States District Court agreed in
McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1987), that the
Evans statement contained a "strong indication of an ab initio relation-
ship between Evans and the authorities," and granted McCleskey relief
based on Massiah. Id. The District court rejected the State's claims that
McCleskey's assertion of the Massiah claim for the first time in his
second federal petition constituted an abuse of the writ, ruling that
McCleskey did not deliberately abandon the claim after raising it in his
first state habeas petition. Id. Significantly, when McCleskey filed his
first federal petition, he did not know about the Evans document or the
identity of the jailer, and his failure to discover this evidence previously
"was not due to [McCleskey's] inexcusable neglect." Id., (quoting
McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A). The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
ruling that the district court should have dismissed McCleskey'sMassiah
claim as an abuse of the writ, principally because he raised a Massiah
claim in state habeas and did not pursue it in his first federal habeas
petition. McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342 (C.A. 11 1989).
McCleskey then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court. In granting certiorari, the Court asked the
parties to address specifically whether the State must demonstrate that
a claim was deliberately abandoned in a earlier petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in order to establish that inclusion of that claim in a
subsequent habeas petition constitutes abuse of the writ. McCleskey v.
Zant, 496 U.S. __, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990).
This Supreme Court decision is concerned mainly with whether a
claim under Massiah, raised for the first time in a petitioner's second
federal habeas petition, will be dismissed without consideration of the
merits as a violation of federal habeas rules prohibiting "abuse of the
writ."
HOLDING
The Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 opinion, held that when a prisoner
files a second or subsequent habeas petition, the government bears the
burden of pleading abuse of the writ. If the government so pleads, the
burden shifts to the petitioner to excuse his failure to raise the claim
earlier by showing cause as well as actual prejudice or by showing
fundamental miscarriage of justice.
McCleskey failed to demonstrate cause for his failure to raise the
Massiah claim in his first federal habeas petition, which constitutes
"inexcusable neglect," an abuse of the writ. According to the Court, this
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finding of a failure to satisfy the first part of the test made it unnecessary
to consider whether he was prejudiced by his inability to raise the alleged
Massiah violation. The Court also determined that there was no
fundamental miscarriage of justice where the alleged Massiah violation
resulted in the admission at trial of inculpatory evidence. The Court held
that this alleged violation did not affect the reliability of the guilt
determination. Marshall wrotea dissent in which Blackmun and Stevens
joined.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court denied McCleskey relief on the basis of abuse
of the writ because he failed to raise the Massiah violation claim until his
second federal habeas petition, a failure which constitutes inexcusable
neglect. The Court found it significant that McCleskey had included a
Massiah violation claim in his first state habeas petition. The court did
not find it persuasive that the evidence supporting each Massiah claim
were entirely different and the State had deliberately withheld the 21-
page Evans statement on which McCleskey relied for his federal petition
until two weeks before its filing and denied any agreement with Evans.
The Court's decision revolved around the conflicting concerns of
finality of decisions and the availability of habeas corpus relief. In
making its determination, the Court relied on precedent, especially
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), and statutory history,
especially 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and § 2255 and Rule 9(b) of the Rules
Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings.
Section 2244, in its original form, addressed the issue of repetitive
federal habeas corpus petitions but did not specifically discuss what
would constitute an abuse of the writ. In Sanders, the Court held that
"Congress' silence on the standard for abuse of the writ involving a new
claim was 'not intended to foreclose judicial application of the abuse-of-
writ principle....' McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1465 (quoting Sanders, 373
U.S. at 11-12). The Sanders Court took it upon itself to address the
definition of and rationale for the doctrine of abuse of the writ. "Equi-
table principles govern abuse of the writ, including 'the principle that a
suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the
relief he seeks,' and that these principles must be applied within the
sound discretion of district courts."' McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at
1465 (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17-18). "Thus, for example, if a
prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collat-
eral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being
granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason, he
may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second
application presenting the withheld ground. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18.
The same may be true if... the prisoner deliberately abandons one of
his grounds at the first hearing .... McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at
1465 (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18)(emphasis added). Alternatively,
"Sanders established that federal courts must reach the merits of an
abusive petition if 'the ends ofjustice demand."' Id. (emphasis added).
Three years after Sanders, Congress amended the habeas corpus
statute § 2244 in order to "alleviate the increasing burden on federal
courts caused by successive and abusive petitions by 'introducing a
greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceedings."'
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1465 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th
Cong., 2dSess., 2 (1966)). Subparagraph (b) provides in pertinent part:
"a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of [a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court] need not be
entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the
United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual
or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application
for the writ, and unless that court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the
applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the
newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ."
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Under the current version, federal courts need not entertain a
second orsubsequent habeas petitions "unless" the prisoner satisfies two
conditions. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1466. First, the petitioner
must allege a new ground for relief. Second, the applicant must satisfy
the judge that he did not deliberately withhold the ground earlier or
"otherwise abuse the writ." Id. at 1466. Section 2244 does not define
what would satisfy the alternative ground. Section 2244 is the heart of
the matter of this case.
In 1976, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 9 of the Rules
Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings made it clear that a "new claim
in a subsequent petition should not be entertained if the judge finds the
failure to raise it earlier inexcusable." Id. at 1467 (quoting Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 9, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, pp. 426-27). Notably,
however, the Notes went no further to explain what constituted "inex-
cusable" action on the part of the petitioner or what activity might
somehow "otherwise abuse the writ." Also, the Notes stated that newly
discovered evidence represented an acceptable excuse forfailing to raise
the claim earlier. Id.
In McCleskey's case, the Eleventh Circuit denied McCleskey relief
on the basis of what it considered deliberate abandonment. Although the
Supreme Court affirmed, it focused on the standard for "inexcusable
neglect." The Court decided that "the same standard used to determine
whether to excuse state procedural defaults should govern the determi-
nation of inexcusable neglect in the abuse of the writ context." Id.
The Court held that because a procedural default will be excused
upon a showing of cause and prejudice, Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977), the Court will apply the same standard to determine if there
has been an abuse of the writ through inexcusable neglect. McCleskey
v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. In procedural default cases, the "cause"
standard requires a showing of some "objective factor external to the
defense [which] impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in state
court. Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). A
specific example of an objective causal factor includes "'interference by
officials' that makes compliance with the state's procedural rule imprac-
ticable."' Id.
The Court condemned the heavy costs to finality, resources, and the
system associated with habeas review and claimed that these disruptions
are far more severe when the petitioner raises a claim for the first time
in a second or subsequent federal habeas petition. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct.
at 1469. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the federal writ
of habeas corpus overrides all concerns about finality, resources, and
jurisprudence when "a petitioner raises a meritorious constitutional
claim in a proper manner in a habeas petition." Id.
The Court attempted to apply the Wainright cause and prejudice
standard to the facts of this case. The Court acknowledged that
McCleskey based his Massiah claim in his second federal habeas
petition solely on the 21-page Evans document not available to him until
after the filing of the first federal petition. However, the Court focused
only on the fact that McCleskey did not show cause for failure to raise
the claim as opposed to his showing of cause for failure to collect
evidence in support of it. Id. at 1472. Although the Court accepted the
District Court finding that the document itself was neither known nor
reasonably discoverable at the time of the first federal petition, the Court
nevertheless held that the fact "[t]hat McCleskey did not possess or
could not reasonably have obtained certain evidence fails to establish
cause if other known or discoverable evidence could have supported the
claim in any event.... For cause to exist, the external impediment,
whether it be government interference or the reasonable unavailability
of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented [the] petitioner
from raising the claim." Id. In the Court's view, because the Evans
statement recounted discussions in which McCleskey had participated
and because, during questioning at trial, McCleskey admitted knowl-
edge of other facts contained in the Evans document, McCleskey was on
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notice to pursue the Massiah claim in his first federal habeas petition, as In response to this decision, it is appropriate to raise on habeas
he had done in his first state petition. Id. at 1473. every federal claim remotely suggested by the trial evidence or subse-
In its installation of the cause and prejudice standard, the Court also quent investigation in hopes that further investigation will strengthen it.
dispensed with the argument that the State's withholding of the Evans Second, the trial record should show detailed inquiry concerning the
statement was misconduct. Because the State turned over the 21-page existence of Massiah relationships, as well as Giglio and Brady materi-
document upon request in 1987, the District Court had found no als. If possible, the Commonwealth's attorney should be required to
wrongful conduct in the State's failure to hand it over earlier, and the deny on the record the existence of any such evidence.
"document [was] not critical to McCleskey's notice of a Massiah claim
anyway." Id. at 1474 (emphasis added). Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Mclnerney
LANKFORD v. IDAHO
111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1983, Lankford was convicted as an alder and abettor to a robbery
and double murder under Idaho's felony-murder statute. At his arraign-
ment, the judge had informed Lankford that the maximum punishment he
could receive if convicted was either life imprisonment or the death
penalty.
Prior to his sentencing hearing Lankford requested, and the trial court
ordered, that the State give notice of whether it intended to seek the death
penalty and, if so, what aggravating circumstances the State would offer
in support of the death penalty. The State responded that it would not seek
the death penalty. Lankford proceeded to file numerous motions with the
trial court. The court failed to mention the possibility of imposing the
death penalty at all proceedings after the arraignment.
At the sentencing hearing, Lankford was represented by a new
attorney who was denied access to the trial transcript that included the
arraignment. The prosecutor offered no evidence, relied on the trial
record, and explained why he had not recommended the death penalty.
Lankford's counsel made no reference to the death penalty. The trialjudge
stated th at he found Lankford's testimony to b e unworthy of belief and that
the State's recommendation of an indeterminate life sentence was too
lenient. Following a weekend recess, the trial judge sentenced Lankford
to death.
Lankford appealed on thegrounds that the trial courthad violated due
process by not giving notice that it intended to consider the death penalty
despite the State's notice that it would not ask for the death penalty. The
trial court responded that Lankford was provided notice through the Idaho
Code and that the prosecutor's intent not to seek the death penalty was not
controlling. The Idaho supreme court affirmed and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the Idaho court's holding and re-
manded. The Court held that "the sentencing process in this case violated
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because at the time
of the sentencing hearing, Lankford and his counsel did not have adequate
notice that the judge might sentence him to death." 111 S.Ct. 1723, 1724
(1991). The Court held that lack of notice to Lankford created an
impermissible risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned.
The Court found that the notice provided by the Idaho statute and the
arraignment did not survive the State's response to the court order because
the order limited the issues in further proceedings.
The Court further found that the trial judge's silence following the
State's response to the order "had the practical effect of concealing from
the parties the principal issue to be decided at the hearing." Id. at 1723.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court began its reasoning by stating that the issue in
this case was one of procedure rather than one of substantive power.
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho's substantive law, a trial judge's power to
disregard a prosecutor's recommendation as to sentencing is not limited
by this decision.
The Court stated that the trial court's presentencing order was
analogous to a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried in that it ordered
the parties to state the aggravating and mitigating factors on which they
intended to rely at the penalty hearing.
Lack of notice to Lankford, the Court found, also inhibited his
counsel from presenting evidence of mitigating factors unique to imposi-
tion of the death penalty. For example, Lankford had taken two polygraph
tests before the trial which tended to support his contention that he did not
do the actual killing. Under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
Lankford argued, these tests would have been admissible at the penalty
phase of his trial since they would have shown that his degree of
participation was not that of the actual killer. This evidence, the Court
held, might have influenced the trial court's deliberations as to whether to
impose the death penalty. Therefore, Lankford recognizes the continued
validity of cases such as Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (holding
that some evidence is admissible at the penalty stage of a capital murder
trial that would not be admissible under ordinary rules of evidence) and
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that in some circum-
stances the death penalty may not be constitutionally imposed on an
accomplice). These issues arise only in the context of a capital penalty
trial. It is imperative that Virginia defense counsel know what issues are
to be litigated at the penalty stage in order to meet prosecution evidence
in aggravation and to offer mitigating evidence to the sentencer. Notice
of the issues to be litigated also allows defense counsel to make use of
favorable law relevant to the presentation of mitigating evidence at the
sentencing hearing.
Although the Court noted that the presentencing order "did not
expressly place any limits on counsel's preparation," 111 S. Ct. at 1729,
the question is whether "counsel had adequate notice of the critical issue
that the judge was actually debating." Id. at 1729. The Court quoted
Justice Frankfurter: "The validity and moral authority of a conclusion
largely depend on the mode by which it was reached ... No better
instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person
in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity
to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951).
It is well established that one vital function of the adversarial
process of the guilt phase of a capital trial is truth-seeking. To reiterate the
equivalency of the sentencing hearing to the guilt phase as far as counsel
